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# The Metrification of ‘Quality’ and the Fall of the Academic Profession

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IN 2012 the British sociologist Roger Burrows published an article titled ‘Living with the H-Index. Metric assemblages in the academy’. In the opening lines he explains the long term effects of the economization of the university on the workforce as follows:

*...“Something has changed in the [British] academy. Many academics are exhausted, stressed, overloaded, suffering from insomnia, feeling anxious, hurt, guilt, and ‘out-of-placeness’. One can observe it all around: a deep, affective, somatic crisis threatens to overwhelm us [...] We know this; yet somehow we feel unable to reassert ourselves [...]. In our brave new world, it seems that a single final criterion of value is recognized: a quantitative, economic criterion. All else is no more than a means. And there is a single method for ensuring that this criterion is satisfied: quantified control”<sup>1</sup> ...*

In this article<sup>2</sup> I will take Burrows diagnosis as point of departure and I will argue that the neo-liberal reforms of the universities since the 1980’s have installed a type of governance—usually known as ‘New Public Management’—that is undermining the very idea of professionalism.<sup>3</sup> NPM does so basically by replacing professional ideas and practices concerning the judgment of quality—and thus of professional selection—by the ‘metrification of output’ in both the domain of teaching and of research. As the very idea of the modern university is based on the idea of professional specialization, NPM is simply making the discussion about ‘the idea of the university’ irrelevant while we speak.<sup>4</sup> NPM does so because metrification implies the replacement of professional autonomy by permanent quantified assessments, by the gradual replacement of tenured faculty positions by casualized academic labour and—in the Dutch case—also by ‘performance agreements’ between the government and the universities. I use the example of the Dutch universities in order to analyze ‘Impact Factor’ measurement and “performance agreements”.

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The basic argument behind my thesis is that professions need professional autonomy in order to function properly and that quantified control makes this impossible. In order to explain this I want to elaborate on the sociological characteristics of professions and on the differences between professions on the one side, and workers and employees on the other.

The crucial sociological distinction is that professions determine their own *standards*—their own criteria of evaluation—in order to ensure the quality that their professional performances specifically require. Therefore all professions determine their own professional hierarchy; locally, nationally and globally. This hierarchy is ultimately based upon the reputation of the individual professionals. His or her reputation is in turn based on the assessment by the professional community; in this case,

the contribution of the individual scholar to the profession’s body of knowledge. Moreover, professions determine their own procedures of inclusion and of exclusion. Because of this self-determination, professions are basically self-governing institutions when it comes to quality standards. In order for the professions to function, academics need this autonomy, and universities—in order to take quality control seriously and to function professionally—need representative shared-governance by the teaching and researching members of the faculty.<sup>5</sup>

In the Netherlands, however, the principle of shared-governance was replaced in 1997 by a strictly bureaucratic top/down model including a strict hierarchical ordering of all faculty positions and tasks, like in an idealised Weberian bureaucracy. Typically all faculty activities since the introduction of the ‘Universitaire Functie Ordening’ (UFO) in 2003 are subdivided in a limited number of ‘competences’—since 2011: 40!—which are strictly connected to ‘functional profiles’ (“functieprofielen”) and thus to the hierarchical positions. Typically too all important activities require the authorisation and the signature by ‘the superior’ (‘de leidinggevende’).<sup>6</sup>

This model received the Orwellian name ‘steering at a distance’ and was—also faithful to the inverted logic of Orwell’s ‘1984’—advertised as the solution to ‘the problem of bureaucracy’.<sup>7</sup> Since then, the academic-professional concept of quality has been replaced by the NPM-notion of ‘educational efficiency’ in teaching and ‘impact factor’ in research.<sup>8</sup> And since ‘educational efficiency’ and ‘impact factor’ are fixed in quantitative terms and are controlled by NPM-management based on its political priorities—namely, budget cuts on public spending—the academics can no longer work according to their own professional standards.<sup>9</sup> Both the self-governance of professionals concerning quality standards and the professional time regime (that is the time needed to meet the professional criteria) have been replaced by a rigid regime of quantified control.<sup>10</sup> As to the individual and collective ‘performance’ in research the ‘impact-factor’ of publications has over the last 30 years turned into the ‘golden standard’ of ‘quality measurement’.

The steep rise to the ‘top’ of ‘impact factor’ measurement has recently been analyzed by the Austrian sociologist Christian Fleck and both its short history and its utter lack of any disciplinary rationality are nothing less than bewildering.<sup>11</sup> This holds for the fields that are recognized as ‘disciplines’, the journals that are excluded and the new ones that are included in the citation indexes, the time span that citations are tracked, and last but not least: the way in which the nationality of the authors of publications is established by the firms that produce the citation indexes.

Fleck did a case study of the field of sociology with remarkable results:

*“A case-by-case check brought strange results: In practically all cases the ostensible ‘country of publication’ was indeed the location of the publishing house. For instance the Journal of Sociology is indicated as being located in England only because its publisher Sage is, whereas the editors are located down under and the journal is nothing less than the official journal of The Australian Sociological Association (tasa). Scrutinizing all journals’ websites revealed that it is impossible to assign a nation state to each of them. Whenever the group of editors assembled scholars from more than one country, I moved them to the “international” group, in sum. The alleged ‘nationality’ of the journals changed dramatically in some cases, in particular the United Kingdom and the Netherlands lost many, whereas the number of journals located in the United States went down only slightly”.*<sup>12</sup>

Flecks ‘discovery’ that the nationality of the academic journals is identified with the nationality of the publisher may explain, among other things, what is known as ‘the Dutch paradox’. This paradox refers to the supposed ‘fact’ that the ‘output’ alias the ‘productivity’ of Dutch researchers is significantly higher than of most researchers outside the Netherlands.<sup>13</sup> This ‘fact’ is quite surprising because Dutch spending on the universities and research is below the European average. Moreover, it is increasingly sinking in relative terms due to the sustained Dutch saving policy on education and research.<sup>14</sup> Therefore successive Dutch governments have congratulated themselves on basis of the ‘Impact Factor’ (IF) statistics that suggest that the Dutch have discovered the formula of “sitting on the first row for a penny” (“voor een dubbeltje op de eerste rang zitten”). What is regarded as common sense for most other professional activities—from playing football or tennis to performing music or collecting art—the insight that there is a strong and positive correlation between the size of an investment and its ‘output’—is explicitly denied for academic activities.<sup>15</sup> Therefore the Dutch governments, irrespective of their political colours, have stubbornly continued to save money on the universities since the 1980’s.

Fleck’s ‘discovery’, however, suggests that the comparatively good ‘productivity’ of Dutch research may be attributed to other factors. The first factor is that the Netherlands—being a ‘tax haven’ for multinationals—is the registered ‘home base’ of some big publishing houses that produce above average numbers of academic journals—like Elsevier Reed and Wolters Kluwer. This fact helps to explain why ‘Dutch’ journals are doing so well in international comparisons.

The second factor is the fact that publications are registered as ‘Dutch’ when at least one of its authors is based at a Dutch university (and not necessarily being a Dutch citizen). This factor accounts for some 50% of the ‘Dutch’ publications, because half of the ‘Dutch’ publications have at least one author who is based at a non-Dutch university.<sup>16</sup>

The third factor is also due to the method of measurement. The relative high ‘productivity’ can partially be explained by the relative low number of Dutch researchers, as the authors of the NOWT-report mention in a footnote.<sup>17</sup> The fourth factor is again related to the method of measurement: the authors state that the (high) level of aggregation of their data may have a “significant influence” on the collection of publications and thus on the citation and impact scores.<sup>18</sup>

The fifth factor explaining ‘Dutch’ ‘productivity’ is

also mentioned in the footnotes of the very same report that ‘registers’ the Dutch ‘success’: possible ‘biases’ due to methods of measurement, like the English language bias of the ‘Web of Science’ and the limited validity of the measurements due to changes in the categorisations of journals, making comparisons over time adventurous to say the least.

A final factor concerns the assumption that the introduction of the measurement indicators of ‘Web of Science’ is not causing disturbing ‘external’ effects itself—and if they do, that they do this everywhere in the same manner.<sup>19</sup> The retrospective nature of rankings is thus carefully ignored, including the established fact that the retroactivity varies with the ‘local’ effects of rankings.<sup>20</sup>

So, all in all, on closer analysis one wonders on what grounds *other than political* anybody would take the ‘measurement’ of ‘productivity’ based on ‘impact factors’ seriously *at all*. Fleck’s conclusion seems inescapable:

*“The quite recently established regime of IFs [Impact Factors] is driven by the business concerns of two international corporations, Thomson Reuters and Elsevier, and accepted as the gold standard in today’s academic market by the newly emerging elite of university administrators and policymakers, using it whenever it fits their impression management strategies”.*<sup>21</sup>

A recent case study on impact factor measurement by the Dutch philosopher of science Hans Radder corroborates Fleck’s findings. Radder analysed four issues of well known journals in philosophy and the social sciences and checked how the factual citations compared to the presuppositions of ‘impact factor measurement’.<sup>22</sup> First he came to the conclusion that there are no factual grounds to prefer journal articles to book chapters because more than half of the factual citations in his sample refer to book chapters. His second conclusion is that the ‘Journal Impact Factor’ (JIF) is based on a far shorter time frame—two years—than the actual citations suggest and therefore is arbitrary and meaningless. Moreover, circa 25% of the citations to journal articles refer to journals that are not included in ‘Web of Science’ so their ‘impact’ is missing in the ‘JIF’.

All in all we can conclude that the installing of the new regime of ‘impact factors’ was and still is the ‘Great Leap Forward’ in the de-professionalization of the faculty. Paradoxically, simultaneous with their factual de-professionalization, academic professionals are systematically being represented in NPM-discourse as entrepreneurial subjects responsible for their own ‘business’, that is, for the (financial) ‘output’ they ‘produce’ for ‘the university’ through cost ‘efficient’ teaching and ‘excellent’ research. Due to the continuing casualization of academic work research in the meantime has been transformed into a (financial) privilege of the happy few who are successful in obtaining researchgrants.<sup>23</sup>

As Rosalind Gill has shown, the precarious working conditions of the casualized academics—and most of the newcomers in NPM-universities are casualized—in the meantime have become very similar to the casualized labour force in the cultural sector.<sup>24</sup> Of course this observation does not ignore the fact that the—fast shrinking—tenured part of the faculty, especially the full professors, are working under different and far better

conditions than their casualized ‘colleagues’. The point is that casualization has become the NPM-rule while tenure-track and tenure have become the exception for newcomers in the university system.<sup>25</sup>

The crucial fact here is that these control systems—increasingly advertised as ‘audits’—are not set and run by professionals themselves but by politicians and university managers according to their political agenda.<sup>26</sup> The reality that many managers and politicians are *former* professionals is not relevant. What is relevant is that they no longer behave like professionals because they do not stick to the quality standards of their profession. Professionals know and acknowledge that ‘the Gods may be uncooperative’. To the contrary, managers and politicians presuppose that the Gods can be forced to cooperate and to obey their policy plans and statistics. If the facts contradict the statistics, it is so much the worse for the facts.

As soon as the academic professionals are transformed into ‘producers’ of fixed ‘outputs’—and students into their ‘consumers’—the perversion of professionalism is guaranteed because professional standards of quality go down the drain. ‘Perverse stimuli’ in order to meet policy goals—by adapting the ‘output’ to policy statistics irrespective of quality standards—then move to the center of the university system—with ‘institutional dysfunction’ and cynicism on the workforce as predictable results.<sup>27</sup> ‘Campbell’s Law’ in social psychology would predict that much: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social process it was intended to monitor.”<sup>28</sup>

Let me illustrate my last statement about ‘fixed outputs’ and forcing the Gods to cooperate with policy plans and statistics with the example of the University of Utrecht—which is the Dutch university that usually ranks highest.<sup>29</sup> Just like all the other Dutch universities the University of Utrecht in 2012 has signed so-called ‘Performance Agreements’ with the Dutch government concerning the ‘improvement’ of the ‘quality’ of education and research.<sup>30</sup> For simplicity’s sake I will restrict myself to the area of ‘educational efficiency’.

In order to increase the NPM-‘quality’ of education, the management of University Utrecht has promised to reduce the drop-out rate of students systematically. Utrecht promised the government to reduce the drop-out rate after the 1<sup>st</sup> year from 20% in 2006 and 18% in 2010 to 15% in 2016. Politicians and managers regard the reduction of the dropout rate as a crucial indicator of the improvement of ‘quality’ that is identical to the ‘success’ of their own policies and those professionals that don’t produce the right ‘improvements’—at least in their statistics—are facing serious problems. In this context the fact that the ‘modern’ universities are silently abolishing tenure and tenure track jobs, leaving most newcomers completely dependent on HRM-‘evaluations’ for new, temporary, contracts, is all the more significant.<sup>31</sup>

Utrecht has also promised the Dutch government to deliver more ‘excellent’ students. Utrecht will raise the percentage of ‘excellent’ students participating in ‘honours courses’ from 5% in 2006 and 9% in 2010 to 12% in 2016. Again we see the promise of guaranteed ‘progress’. It is ‘excellence on delivery’—by silently speeding up the diploma mill.

Utrecht University is by no means the only institution promising the Dutch government exactly what it asks for; that is, more ‘quality’ in education and research for less money. All do. For instance, the ‘Fontys Hogescholen’—a conglomerate of professional schools—have promised to ‘deliver’ 95% of its students with a degree within 5 years! In comparison to Fontys the promise of Utrecht University even appears fairly modest: it will only raise its present percentage of 74% ‘successful students’ within 4 years to 77% in 2016—in 2006 the percentage was 69%—so there is still plenty of room for further ‘improvement’ in the future.

So much for my educational examples of quantified systems of control, systems of which the ‘Performance Agreements’ only represent a top level, together with the university rankings. Below this top level there is a whole network of other quantified control systems, working from the level of the individual faculty member over the institutional and national levels to the international level. I am referring to the citation index, workload models, transparent costing data, research assessments, teaching quality assessments and university league tables. Ideally, all these systems are somehow coordinated by so-called ‘Human Resource Management’ which is an integral part of New Public Management.<sup>32</sup> In fact, they all put increasing pressure on all faculty members, especially on the fast growing majority without tenure or tenure track, while stimulating a bewildering variety of perverse and counterproductive effects, ranging from strategic citing over (self-)plagiarism to outright fraud.<sup>33</sup>

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Characteristic of all these external systems of control is that they basically replace the idea of professional quality by measurable quantity. They exchange professionalism for metrification. This metrification is predominantly based on so-called output indicators: output of research, output of teaching, etc. New Public Management claims that metrification confers ‘transparency’ and ‘objectivity’ to ‘quality control’ in closed and self-serving professions. Therefore (supposedly democratic) ‘transparency’, (supposedly democratic) ‘accountability’, and (economic) ‘efficiency’ are the buzzwords in NPM—discourse.<sup>34</sup> All the ‘free market’ rhetoric notwithstanding, Richard Münch and Len Ole Schäfer have argued that ‘output-financing’ of the universities simultaneously generates oligopoly-formation and “a kind of academic cannibalism” in which the financially successful departments, universities, etc. are driving the financially less successful ones out of competition. This tendency is undermining the diversity and capacity for innovation of the university system *as such*.<sup>35</sup>

In the last instance NPM has moved the power of the professions to determine their own criteria of evaluation to a very small number of mainly Anglo-Saxon corporations that produce the data for university rankings. For the humanities this is very bad news because the humanities hardly matter for these corporations. The typical ‘output’ of the humanities—the monograph, especially—does not show up in their ‘output indicators’. I am now referring to corporations like *Thomson/Reuters*, that produces the *Web of Knowledge*; *Google*, that produces *Google Scholar*; *Elsevier Reed* that produces *Scopus*; the *Times Higher Education*, that pro-

duces the *THE* ranking, etc. This also holds for the Dutch NOWT-report that is based on the data of 'Web of Science'. In the report's overview of 'impact factors' the humanities are all of a sudden excluded on the basis of the argument that... citation scores in this domain are poor indicators of 'quality'.<sup>36</sup>

Because all university rankings are based on a mix of 'output indicators', the rankings produce widely diverging results for most universities.<sup>37</sup> For example, two years ago the global ranking of the Dutch university of Utrecht varied somewhere between place no. 50 and place no. 100 in the various rankings. Nevertheless, climbing in these rankings has become the primary policy goal of university management because climbing in ranking is perceived as the only 'proof' of the 'success' of management policies and of thus of the 'improvement' of the university's NPM-'quality'. The fundamental fact that universities almost invariably occupy quite different positions in different rankings—with the remarkable consequence that the 'climbing' and the 'falling' of a university may occur *simultaneously*—is simply ignored. This variety in ranking results may even be seen as a managerial advantage because it always allows management to pick its favourite ranking for its 'public relations', as Fleck also observes.

However this may be, the best thing university management can do is to establish its *own* ranking, as Leiden University understood some years ago. In that case you can fix your own mix of output indicators and you can basically fix your own ranking.<sup>38</sup> We could call this '*rank fixing*', a term inspired by the recent discovery of 'match fixing' in sports. This has been studied by sociologists<sup>39</sup>, and is an instance of what "Campbell's Law" states in social psychology.

Given its fundamental policy relevance in NPM ranking is far from an 'innocent' practice. Increasingly university management is channeling research funding exclusively into those branches of 'their firm' that make 'top' contributions to the university's position in the rankings and are withholding funding from those branches that do not. This practice has already led to the shutting down of quite a few departments in the humanities and social sciences over the last 20 years—and most certainly there is more 'concentration' to come because neoliberal governments are simultaneously deciding which branches of the university are important for 'the economy' and therefore are worthy of public funding in the future. In the UK and in the US the so-called 'STEM' sciences have been labelled as such—Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics. In the Dutch case the representatives of nine economic 'topsectors' have been installed by the government to determine which researchers shall live or die in the future. The 'topsectors' are: 1. Horticulture and Basic Materials; 2. Agri & Food; 3. Water; 4. Life Sciences & Health; 5. Chemical Industry; 6. High Tech; 7. Energy; 8. Logistics, and 9. Creative Industry.<sup>40</sup> For those academics who nevertheless may miss the 'message' the Dutch policy paper stated explicitly: "No business as usual, the task [of the government] is to use science more effectively as fuel in the pipeline 'Knowledge-knowhow-cash register'".<sup>41</sup>

As a consequence of this economic policy the Dutch universities are now demanding the 'valorisation' ('valorising') of research from the faculty—meaning that you can show how your research will fuel the pipeline

'knowledge-knowhow-cash register'—and vice versa many academics in the human sciences that apply for research grants now are trying to make plausible that their actual core interest and activity was and is "creative industry", being the only designated economic 'top sector' which looks slightly familiar to them.

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So academics are actually losing their jobs as a direct consequence of the policy and practice of 'valorisation' and of ranking.<sup>42</sup> Moreover would-be future academics in an increasing number of 'uneconomic' branches are confronted with blocked or non-existing career paths as a consequence of ranking policies. Small wonder therefore that not all faculty members are enthusiastic about ranking and assessments.

This lack of enthusiasm among the faculty is not unknown to university management given the fact that quite a few authors have published advice on how to deal with this 'toxic' problem.<sup>43</sup> Tara Newman for instance advises university managers to actively recruit "missionaries" and "cheerleaders" among the faculty who can help management to solve the problem that "overwhelmingly, administrators are being faced with faculty resistance to assessment efforts":

*"The overwhelming viewpoint of faculty is that accreditation—and therefore assessment—is other-imposed and not meaningful to their work as instructors".<sup>44</sup>*

Newman explains to management that this lack of enthusiasm of the faculty is based on their lack of understanding:

*"When there is a lack of understanding of assessment, faculty members tend to feel imposed upon. Questions of academic freedom arise. When the understanding is clear, however, an intrinsic motivation begins to develop and higher levels of importance are placed upon the efforts".<sup>45</sup>*

Now the 'trick' is to convince the faculty that continuous assessment is just part of *their* profession and to develop "a culture of evidence within an institution".... "If administrators want faculty buy in, they have to invite faculty to be engaged in the process—not merely go through the motions to satisfy external requirement"—especially because in an "overall low-trust environment" faculty will just be "playing the game".<sup>46</sup> In the end everything depends on making the faculty understand that assessment is part of teaching and management can do this by "promoting professional development" and creating "Faculty Learning Communities (FLC)".<sup>47</sup>

Next to the creation of FLCs in order to 're-educate' the faculty, the only problem university management has left is to get their own ranking system—if they develop one—accepted by other universities that have gone down the same road. For good New Public managers that is no problem because they simply presuppose that if the Gods are not cooperative, you just can make them cooperate: they all share a principled preference for the world as it is described in their policy statistics. If you don't like or distrust the facts as a manager, you better fix them beforehand.

- <sup>1</sup> Roger Burrows, 'Living with the H-Index? Metric assemblages in the contemporary academy', *The Sociological Review*, 60 (May 2012), nr. 2, pp. 355-56. Burrows is citing: Grahame Lock and Herminio Martins. 'Quantified Control and the Mass Production of "Psychotic Citizens"'
- <sup>2</sup> This article is an abridged version of 'Fixing the Facts. The Rise of New Public Management, the Metrification of "Quality" and the Fall of the Academic Professions' that will be published in: *Journal of Social History and the History of Social Movements* 52 (2014). I dedicate this article to my former colleague and friend Grahame Lock, who untimely died on July 21<sup>st</sup>. 2014.
- <sup>3</sup> Burrow's diagnosis is supported by many others. See Rosalind Gill, 'Breaking the Silence. The Hidden Injuries of the Neoliberal University', in: Ryan Flood and Rosalind Gill (eds.), *Secrecy and Silence in the Research Process. Feminist Reflections*, London 2010, pp. 228-244; Susan Ryan, 'Academic Zombies. A failure of resistance or a means of survival?', *Australian Universities Review* 54 (2012), nr. 2, pp. 1-11; Katherine Bode and Leigh Dale, "'Bullshit'? An Australian Perspective; or, What can an Organisational Change Impact Statement tell us about Higher Education in Australia?', *Australian Humanities Review*, (November 2012), nr. 53, at: <http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-November-2012/bode&dale.html>; Andrew Nadolny and Susanne Ryan, 'McUniversities revisited: a comparison of university and McDonald's casual employee experiences in Australia', *Studies in Higher Education*, 2013, 1-16; Rosalind Gill, 'Academics, Cultural Workers and Critical Labour Studies', *Journal of Cultural Economy* Vol. 7, nr. 1, 2014, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/17513758.2014.900000>; Nikki Sullivan and Jane Simon, 'Academic Work Cultures: Somatic Crisis in the Enterprise University', *Somatechnics* 4 (2014), nr.2, pp.205-218; Nan Seuffert, 'Engagement, Resistance and Restructuring: A Legal Challenge', *Somatechnics* 4 (2014), nr.2, pp.272-287.
- <sup>4</sup> See for academics as professionals: Keith Roberts and Karen Donahue, 'Professing Professionalism. Bureaucratization and Deprofessionalization in the Academy', *Sociological Focus*, 33 (October 2000), pp. 365-383; Frank Donogoe, *The Last Professors. The Corporate University and the Fate of the Humanities*, Fordham UP 2008.
- <sup>5</sup> For the historical relationship between education and democracy as ideals in the US see: Wendy Brown, 'The End of Educated Democracy', in: *Representations*, 116 (Autumn 2011), nr. 1, pp. 19-41; 'Save the university', Berkeley 26 September 2009, at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aR4xYBGdQgw>.
- <sup>6</sup> See [http://www.vsnv.nl/functie\\_ordeningsysteem\\_ufo.html](http://www.vsnv.nl/functie_ordeningsysteem_ufo.html)
- <sup>7</sup> Chris Lorenz, 'If you're so smart, why are you under surveillance? Universities, Neoliberalism and New Public Management', in: *Critical Inquiry*, Spring 2012 Issue, pp.599-630.
- <sup>8</sup> When all students get their (ECTS) creditpoints 'on time' the 'teaching efficiency' of the teacher is 100%. When 10% of the students are 'delayed' in obtaining their creditpoints the teachers 'teaching efficiency' is 90% etc. Therefore striving after maximum 'teaching efficiency' always manifests itself in striving after a minimal 'drop out' rate. Also 'selection' of student performances by the teacher on qualitative grounds always appears as a 'drop out' and as a 'loss of production' within this scheme. See Lorenz (1995) op cit., pp.601-610 and 621-625.
- <sup>9</sup> See Lock and Martins, 'Quantified Control'; Grahame Lock and Chris Lorenz, 'Revisiting the university front', *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 26 (2007), pp. 405-418; Lorenz (1995) op cit.
- <sup>10</sup> For the effects of the neoliberal time management see: Paula Baron, 'Working the Clock: The Academic Body on Neoliberal Time', *Somatechnics* 4 (2014), nr.2, pp.253-271.
- <sup>11</sup> Christian Fleck, 'The Impact Factor Fetishism', *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 54 (2013), nr.2, pp.327-356.
- <sup>12</sup> Fleck, op cit., pp. 344-45.
- <sup>13</sup> See Nederlands Observatorium van Wetenschap en Technologie (NOWT), *Wetenschaps- en Technologie Indicatoren Rapport 2010*.
- <sup>14</sup> See Chris Lorenz, 'It's getting better all the time! Universiteit en New Public Management', in: Fenna Vergeer (ed.), *De Onderwijsbubbel. Over kennisverarming en zelfverrijking*, (Garran: Antwerpen 2011), pp.86-111.
- <sup>15</sup> Cf. Gail Kinman, 'Doing More with Less? Work and Wellbeing in Academics', *Somatechnics* 4 (2014), nr.2, pp. 219-235.
- <sup>16</sup> *Wetenschaps- en Technologie Indicatoren Rapport 2010*, p.89, note 41.
- <sup>17</sup> *Wetenschaps- en Technologie Indicatoren Rapport 2010*, p.91, note 44.
- <sup>18</sup> *Wetenschaps- en Technologie Indicatoren Rapport 2010*, p88-89, note 38.
- <sup>19</sup> *Wetenschaps- en Technologie Indicatoren Rapport 2010*, p.89, note 40.
- <sup>20</sup> See Wendy Espeland and Michael Sauder. 'Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Re-create Social Worlds,' *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol.113 (2007), pp.1-40. They point out that rankings especially generate strategic retroactive action in the 'border zones' of rankings, because management tends to find it important that their institutions obtain or keep e.g. a position in the national or global top-10, top-20, top-50, top 100 etc.
- <sup>21</sup> Fleck, op cit., p.355.
- <sup>22</sup> Hans Radder, *Waartoe wetenschap? Over haar filosofische rechtvaardiging en maatschappelijke legitimering*, at: [http://dare.uvu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/50855/Afscheidscollege\\_Radder.pdf](http://dare.uvu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/50855/Afscheidscollege_Radder.pdf), pp. 8-9. The researched journals are *Journal for General Philosophy of Science/Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, Philosophy of Science, Minerva, and Science, Technology, and Human Values*.
- <sup>23</sup> See Hilde de Weerd, 'Taken for granted', *Times Higher Education*, 16 August 2012, at: <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/taken-for-granted/420848.article>.
- <sup>24</sup> Gill, 2010, op cit.
- <sup>25</sup> Also see: Tanner Mirrlees and Shahid Alvi, 'Taylorizing Academia, Deskilling Professors and Automating Higher Education', *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies* (2014), Vol. 12 Issue 2, pp. 45-73.
- <sup>26</sup> Cris Shore, 'Audit Culture and Illiberal Governance. Universities and the Culture of Accountability', *Anthropological Theory*, 8 (July 2008), pp. 278-299; Mary Strathern (ed.), *Audit Cultures. Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the Academy*. (London: Routledge 2000).
- <sup>27</sup> Wendy Espeland and Michael Sauder. 'Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Re-create Social Worlds,' *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol.113 (2007), pp.1-40 make the same arguments for the effect of rankings.
- <sup>28</sup> Richard Münch and Len Ole Schäfer, 'Rankings, Diversity and the Power of Renewal in Science: A Comparison Between Germany, the UK and the US, in: *European Journal of Education* 49:1 (2014), pp. 60-76.
- <sup>29</sup> *Strategisch Plan Universiteit Utrecht 2012-2016*, at: [http://www.uu.nl/university/utrecht/NL/profiel/Profielmissie/Documents/Strategisch\\_Plan\\_0122016.pdf?referer=university/utrecht/NL/Profielmissie/Documents/Strategisch\\_Plan\\_2012-2016.pdf](http://www.uu.nl/university/utrecht/NL/profiel/Profielmissie/Documents/Strategisch_Plan_0122016.pdf?referer=university/utrecht/NL/Profielmissie/Documents/Strategisch_Plan_2012-2016.pdf) [accessed 28<sup>th</sup>. March 2014].
- <sup>30</sup> 'OCW en Universiteit Utrecht Tekenen Prestatieafspraken' at: <http://pers.uu.nl/ocw/universiteit-utrecht-tekenen-prestatieafspraken/> [accessed 2<sup>8th</sup>. March 2014].
- <sup>31</sup> See Richard Moser. 'Overuse and Abuse of Adjunct Faculty Members Threaten Core Academic Values', *The Chronicle Of Higher Education*. 13 January 2014.
- <sup>32</sup> See Matthew Waring, 'All in This Together? HRM and the Individualisation of the Academic Worker', *Higher Education Policy*, 26 (September 2013), pp. 397-419; Burrows, 2012, op cit.
- <sup>33</sup> See Willem Halfman and Hans Radder, 'Het Academisch Manifest', *Krisis. Tijdschrift voor Actuele Filosofie*, 2013, nr. 3 ([www.krisis.eu](http://www.krisis.eu)); Ruud Abma, *De Publiciteitsfabriek. Over de betekenis van de Affaire Stapel*, Nijmegen 2013; Russell Craig, Joel Amerinc and Dennis Tourish, 'Perverse Audit Culture and Accountability of the Modern Public University', *Financial Accountability & Management* Vol. 30 (2014), no.1, pp.1-24.
- <sup>34</sup> In Lorenz, 2012, op cit: I have analyzed NPM-discourse on education as a 'bullshit-discourse' in the sense that Harry Frankfurt gave the term in his *On Bullshit*, Princeton 2005.
- <sup>35</sup> Richard Münch and Len Ole Schäfer, 'Rankings, Diversity and the Power of Renewal in Science. A Comparison between Germany, the UK and the US', *European Journal of Education* vol.49 (2014), nr.1. pp. 60-76.
- <sup>36</sup> *Wetenschaps- en Technologie Indicatoren Rapport 2010*, note 47, NOWT 2010, p.97, noot 47, Tabel 5.3
- <sup>37</sup> See e.g.: David D. Dill and Maarja Soo. 'Academic Quality, League Tables, and Public Policy: A Cross-National Analysis of University Ranking Systems', *Higher Education*. Vol. 49 (2005), no. 4, pp.495-533; Alex Usher and Massimo Savino. *Higher Education in Europe*. Volume 32 (2007), no. 1; David Pontille and Didier Torny. 'The Controversial Policies of Journal Ratings: Evaluating Social Sciences and Humanities', *Research Evaluation*. Vol. 19 (2010), no. 5. pp. 347-360; Christophe Charle. 'L'évaluation des enseignants-chercheurs. Critiques et propositions', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'Histoire*. Vol. 102 (2009), pp. 159-170; Hildegard Matthies and Dagmar Simon (eds.), *Wissenschaft unter Beobachtung. Effekte und Defekte von Evaluationen*. (Heidelberg: Springer. 2008); Fleck, op cit.
- <sup>38</sup> Actually the Leiden ranking put Leiden University on place nr. 58 in 2013 and Utrecht University on place 64—in the world, that is. See: <http://www.leidenranking.com/ranking> (accessed 3rd. January 2014). The THES-ranking put them on place 67 and 74 respectively while the Sjanghai ranking reversed their hierarchy and put Leiden on place 73 and Utrecht on place 53 in 2013. For many universities the range of variation among the various rankings is even more impressive.
- <sup>39</sup> Espeland and Sauder, 2007, op cit.
- <sup>40</sup> For the Dutch 'topsectoren' policy see: <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ondernemersklimaat-en-innovatie/investeren-in-topsectoren>.
- <sup>41</sup> "Geen business as usual, de opdracht is de wetenschap nog beter in te zetten als brandstof in de pijplijn kennis-kunde-kassa", *Kwaliteit in Verscheidenheid* 2011, at: <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/07/01/kwaliteit-in-verscheidenheid.html>.
- <sup>42</sup> See Frank Donogoe, *The Last Professors. The Corporate University and the Fate of the Humanities*, Fordham UP 2008.
- <sup>43</sup> See Marla Gottschalk, 'Managers Beware: What Toxic "Jane" or "Joe" Can Do to Your Team', <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/article/20140426191009-128811924-managers-beware-what-toxic-jane-or-joe-can-do-to-your-team/>; Hanny Lerner, 'How To Get Rid Of Toxic Employees—And Hire Right', at: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/bannylerner/2013/10/05/how-to-hire-the-right-employees-and-discover-the-toxic-ones/> (accessed at 23-05-2014); Simon Springer, 'The Violence of Neoliberalism', in: Simon Springer a.o (eds.). *The Routledge Handbook of Neoliberalism* (forthcoming).
- <sup>44</sup> Tara Newman, 'Engaging Faculty in the Assessment Process: Recruiting Missionaries and Cheerleaders', *The Journal of Academic Administration in Higher Education* vol.6 (2010), nr.2, pp.9-14.
- <sup>45</sup> Newman, op cit., p.10.
- <sup>46</sup> Newman, op cit., p.10. Cf. Vincent Icke, 'He no playa da game', in: Lorenz (ed.), *If you're so smart why aren't you rich?*, 269-281.
- <sup>47</sup> Newman, op cit., p.11.